

**Spring term 2015**

**Saskia Ruth**

**Wahlmodul: Clientelism and Democracy around the World.**

**Wednesdays: 14.00 – 15.45h**

**First class: 18th February 2015**

**Course Description**

This course provides an introduction to the implications of political clientelism for the quality of democracy. Though the decline of clientelistic practices – such as vote buying and patronage – in democratic contexts has often been predicted, they have proven to be highly adaptive strategies of electoral mobilization and party building. The puzzling persistence of clientelism in new and old democracies inspired researchers to investigate the micro-foundations and causes of this phenomenon. Only recently scholars have turned their attention to the effects of clientelism on the functioning and quality of different democratic institutions. According to these studies, clientelism may have two distinctive implications: (1) If parties in control of government focus their policy programs more likely on those voters that are not inclined to give their vote in exchange to material benefits, clientelism may lead to distorted representation. (2) If political elites face incentives to engage in rent-seeking and to generate targetable private goods, clientelistic practices may lead to inefficient policy implementation. We will analyze these phenomena with an international comparative perspective, with an emphasis on democratic systems in Latin America, Western Europe, as well as Central and Eastern Europe.

The course is structured as follows: The first part focusses on identifying the basic concepts of the course theme different conceptions of clientelism - like vote buying and patronage - and public policy. The second and third part will then be devoted to the study of different arguments in the research literature with respect to the relationship between clientelism and democracy: Firstly, that clientelism may lead to distorted representation, and secondly, that clientelism may lead to inefficient policy implementation. Thereby, we will especially focus on welfare related policy areas like social security, health care, and education.

**Teaching Approach**

The goal of the course is to augment each student's ability to analyze and evaluate complex social phenomena. More specifically, students will be trained to understand policymaking in different environments, to recognize the role of institutions and political actors within the political process, to improve their written and oral English skills, and to work in teams.

**Course Requirements**

All announcements and class related documents will be posted on the class shared course site at OLAT (<https://www.olat.uzh.ch>). Students are expected to complete the assigned readings before the class meeting, this is essential for full participation in the sections. Students should be able to understand and articulate themselves in English as this will be the general classroom language. Of course, perfection is not required but you should be able to make yourself understood. The term paper should be written in English as well. Course grades will be determined as follows: class participation including the preparation of short presentations and team projects (20%), seminar paper with a maximum length of 5000 words (80%).

## **Course Schedule**

### *Basic Reading Recommendations (optional)*

- Abente Brun, Diego and Diamond, Larry (2014): *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert and Wilkinson, Steven I. (2007): *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## **Class 1 (February 18): Introduction, Course Outline, Requirements**

### **PART I: Theories and Concepts**

#### **Class 2 (February 25): What is Clientelism? (I)**

##### *Reading assignments:*

- Hicken, Allen (2011): Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289-310.
- Hilgers, Tina (2011): Clientelism and Conceptual Stretching: Differentiating Among Concepts and Among Analytical Levels. *Theory and Society* 40(5): 567-588.

#### **Class 3 (March 4): What is Clientelism? (II)**

##### *Reading assignments:*

- Schaffer, Frederic Charles (2007): Elections for Sale. The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Chapter 1 “Why Study Vote Buying?” and Chapter 2 “What is Vote Buying?”, pp. 1-30.
- Chandra, Kanchan (2007): Counting Heads: A Theory of Voter and Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies. In Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Eds.): *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 84-109.

#### **Class 4 (March 11): What is Democracy? What is Democratic Quality?**

##### *Reading assignments:*

- Powell, G. Bingham Jr. (2005): The Chain of Responsiveness. In Larry Diamond and Leonard Morlino (Eds.): *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 62-76.
- Shefner, Jon (2013): What is Politics For? Inequality, Representation, and Needs Satisfaction Under Clientelism and Democracy. In Tina Hilgers (Ed.): *Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 41-59.

#### **Class 5 (March 18): Clientelism and Economic Development**

##### *Reading assignments:*

- Kitschelt, Herbert and Kselman, Daniel M. (2013): Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties' Linkage Strategies. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(11): 1453-1484.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Freeze, Kent, Kolev, Kiril and Wang, Yi-Ting (2009): Measuring Democratic Accountability: An Initial Report on an Emerging Data Set. *Revista de Ciencia Política* 29, 3: 741-773.

## **PART II: Clientelism and Political Representation**

### **Class 6 (March 25): Clientelism and Elections: Supply Side**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Stokes, Susan C. (2005): Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315-325.
- Nichter, Simeon (2008): Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 19-31.

### **Class 7 (April 1): Clientelism and Elections: Demand Side**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Calvo, Ernesto and Murillo, Maria V. (2012): When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(7): 851-882.
- Wantchekon, Leonard (2003): Clientelism and Voting Behavior. Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin. *World Politics* 55: 399-422.

### **Class 8 (April 22): Mixing Electoral Strategies I: Diversified Targeting**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Rosas, Guillermo, Noel P. Johnston, and Kirk Hawkins (2014). Local Public Goods as Vote-Purchasing Devices? Persuasion and Mobilization in the Choice of Clientelist payments. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 26, 4: 573-598
- Dunning, Thad and Janhavi Nilekani (2013): Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils. *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 35-56.

### **Class 9 (April 29): Mixing Electoral Strategies II: Segmented Representation**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Luna, Juan Pablo (2010): Segmented Party-Voter Linkages in Latin America: The Case of the UDI. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 42: 325-356.
- Magaloni, Beatriz, Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, and Estévez, Federico (2007): Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico. In Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Eds.): *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182-205.

## **PART III: Clientelism, Policy-Making, and Policy Implementation**

### **Class 10 (May 6): Clientelism and Government Spending**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Remmer, Karen (2007): The Political Economy of Patronage: Expenditure Patterns in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2003. *Journal of Politics* 69(2): 363-377.
- De la O, Ana L. (2013): Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 1-14.

### **Class 11 (May 13): Clientelism, Welfare States, and Social Policy**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Pribble, Jennifer (2013): Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2 "Creating Universalistic Social Policy", pp. 25-38.
- Cook, Linda (2013): Political Clientelism and Social Policy: The Postcommunist Experience. In Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond (Eds.): Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 204-229.

### **Class 12 (May 20): Clientelism and the Bureaucracy**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Hutchcroft, Paul D. (2014): Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines. In Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond (Eds.): Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 174-203.
- Ennsner-Jedenastik, Laurenz (2014): The Politics of Patronage and Coalition: How Parties Allocate Managerial Positions in State-Owned Enterprises. *Political Studies* 62(2): 398-417.

### **Class 13 (May 27): Concluding Session - What is wrong with Clientelism?**

#### *Reading assignments:*

- Buchanan, James and Tullock, Gordon (2004[1962]): The Calculus of Consent. *Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., Chapter 18 "Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency", pp. 253-268.
- Auyero, Javier (1999): "From the Client's Point(s) of View": How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism. *Theory and Society* 28(2): 297-334.